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Introduction 
 When the Confederate States of America succeeded from the Union in 1861, they quickly 
began to issue their own currency to fund their war efforts.   Due to the poor quality of these 
bills, counterfeiting quickly ran rampant within the Confederacy.   By the end of the Civil War in 
1865, the Confederate economy had completely collapsed due mainly the defeat of the 
Confederate army along with hyperinflation.  The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of 
counterfeiting in the Confederate economy by using a more accurate estimation of the total 
amount of counterfeit bills in circulation.  I will also investigate some of the important but 
overlooked sources of Confederate counterfeits such as Havana, Cuba, as well as a new source 
from New York City named “Haney.”  Finally, I will examine the interesting dilemma that the 
United States government faced: officials were effectively unable (or at least unwilling) to 
prosecute counterfeiters because to do so would give de facto recognition of the Confederacy as 
a legitimate country.   
 My hypotheses for this study are as follows.  Hypothesis 1: The Union government could 
not prosecute Confederate counterfeiters because doing so would recognize the Confederacy as a 
legitimate country.  Hypothesis 2: Previous estimations for the total amount of Confederate 
counterfeit bills in the economy are too low.  Hypothesis 3: Many sources of Confederate 
counterfeit bills are often overlooked or under represented, such as Havana, Cuba, which is the 
likely cause of the discrepancy in Hypothesis 2. 
Background 
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 Sam Upham was one of the main counterfeiters of Confederate currency. Although he 
would hold many different jobs throughout his life he began his career as a store clerk in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  He married Anne Bancroft in December 1846, and the couple did 
not stay in Philadelphia for long.  The Uphams embarked on a ship, which sailed to California in 
January 1849.  Within the first three weeks, Upham found over $400 worth of gold nuggets. 
Despite this initial success he decided to find a more reliable career, a job at a local newspaper 
for $100 a day.  This newspaper job would provide him with the printing experience he needed 
to make his counterfeits.  Upham would move back to Philadelphia in 1850 where he would 
continue working for local newspapers before opening his own drugstore.  
 Sam Upham got the idea for his counterfeiting scheme on February 24, 1862 when he 
noticed that his drugstore had sold an unusually large volume of his newspaper, the Philadelphia 
Inquirer. (Weidenmier 1999)  Upham attributed the sales to the printing of a Confederate five 
dollar bill on the front page.  He saw this interest in Confederate currency as a business 
opportunity, and he obtained the electrotype plates that were used to produce the exemplar in the 
newspaper. (Tremmel 2003)  Upham expanded his operations by advertising that he would pay 
for new exemplars of Confederate currency and helped produce 28 different types of currency 
over the course of his operation.   
 Upton began to sell these copies in his drugstore; five dollars would buy you twenty 
thousand dollars of confederate money. Upham promoted his business by printing “Fac-simile 
Confederate Note- Sold Wholesale and Retail by S.C. Upham, 403 Chestnut St. Philadelphia” on 
the bottom of each note. (Tremmel 2003)  This inscription also served to protect him from 
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accusation of being a counterfeiter because the inscriptions meant that the notes could be easily 
recognized as fake.  Thus, Sam Upham claimed throughout the war that his notes were intended 
to be souvenirs and not counterfeits. (Weidenmier 1999)  This inscription could be easily 
trimmed, however, making them identical to Rebel bills.  Later in his operations he dropped the 
inscription altogether. (Tremmel 2003)  By his own accounts in a 1875 letter to Dr. William Lee: 
“I printed from the 12th of March, 1862, to the 1st of August, 1863, one million five hundred and 
sixty four thousand fac-simile Rebel notes, of denominations ranging from five cents to one 
hundred dollars, and presume the Aggregate issue, in dollars and cents, would amount to the 
round number of fifteen millions of dollars” (Lee 1875).   
 It was recognized by the Confederate government that Sam Upham posed a serious threat 
to the Confederate economy.  In response to this threat Jefferson Davis, the President of the 
Confederacy, put a $10,000 bounty on his head that was redeemable, whether he was brought in 
dead or alive. (Weidenmier 1999)  In addition to death threats he received from the Confederacy, 
Sam Upham’s operations were also investigated by the United States Government.  Federal 
agents investigated Upham after receiving a tip that he was also counterfeiting Union paper 
money.  Upham’s statement claimed that he was only counterfeiting Confederate currency for 
the war effort to weaken the Southern economy, a statement which contradicted his previous 
claims that his notes were not meant as counterfeits.  His case was investigated and turned over 
to the United States Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. Stanton dismissed Upham’s case, and 
some historians suspect that he provided aid to Upham’s operation, particularly in the form of 
Confederate banknote papers that had been captured on a blockade runner. (Mihm 2007)   
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 Sam Upham’s operation lasted a total of twelve months. (Weidenmier 1999)  He ended 
his counterfeiting operations in August 1863, due to a fall in demand for his product. 
(Weidenmier 1999)  The drop in demand is likely due to the military defeats of the South at the 
important battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg that summer.  These had cast a doubt on the 
ability for the Confederacy to survive and as a result their economy weakened.  According to 
some historians, this supports the theory that a significant portion of Sam Upham’s orders came 
from cotton smugglers who purchased cotton in the south and smuggled it across enemy lines 
into the north. (Weidenmier 1999)  However, there is evidence, some of which comes from 
Upham himself, that at least a portion of smugglers cheated the southern cotton suppliers by 
purchasing counterfeit notes at deeply discounted rates and passing them off to their suppliers 
who were none the wiser.  There is support for this because around the same time that Sam 
Upham quit producing counterfeit Confederate bills these bills stopped being an acceptable 
medium of exchange for cotton smuggling.  Had Sam Upham been supplying these notes as 
awartime curiosity as he had claimed then it is likely that the production of these notes would 
have continued in some capacity for the duration of the war.  The fact that production ends at 
roughly the same time that the demand for counterfeit bills dries up suggests that smugglers and 
other people who were looking to pass off the bills as legitimist were the real target market.  
 Winthrop E. Hilton is the second source of Confederate counterfeits about which 
historians know a significant amount.  Before the war, Hilton ran a printing shop located at 11 
Spruce Street in New York City.  He printed a number of legitimate items such as business 
cards, circulars, posters, etc. (Tremmel 2003)  It is unclear what prompted Hilton to begin 
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making counterfeits; however, there is some evidence suggesting that he was inspired by 
Upham’s booming business venture.  Upham himself was aware of Hilton’s competition and felt 
that he was copying his business, an opinion he expressed in a letter to Dr. William Lee. (Glaser 
1967)  Regardless of Hilton’s motivation, by the fall of 1862, he began selling high quality 
counterfeits of Confederate paper money.  Unlike Sam Upham, Hilton did not hide the purpose 
of his counterfeits.  In a newspaper ad for his business, he described his bills as “so exactly like 
the genuine that where one will pass current the other will go equally well.”(Tremmel 2003) 
Hilton’s counterfeiting operation was put out of business on December 31, 1863 when he 
was arrested by U.S. Martial Robert Murry.  The arresting officer also found $6,000,000 worth 
of Confederate bonds, $1,000,000 worth of Confederate bills, and the equipment required to 
produce these items.  The tip was revealed to be an encoded message sent to a Confederate spy 
in Canada, which claimed that Hilton was actually producing real bills for the Confederacy and 
that he was planning to flee the country soon to Canada, and from there the Confederacy. 
It is now believed that the Canadian spy was actually a set up by the Confederates in 
order to remove the counterfeiter who was doing damage to their economy.  There is 
considerable evidence suggesting that this was actually the case.  First, the letters which were 
used to incriminate Hilton were not coded properly by the Confederacy, which allowed them to 
be cracked more quickly by the Union codebreakers.  Additionally, there was an article 
published in Richmond’s Daily Dispatch on May 10, 1864 that claimed that Confederate agents 
had set Hilton up and went into detail about how they had done so.  Finally, there is a letter from 
Confederate Secretary of the Treasury Christopher Memminger to Major General William 
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Whiting discussing an article that told of Hilton’s arrest in New York.  The Confederate 
Secretary of the Treasury stated that Hilton had no connection to the Treasury Department but 
that it was best to let the Union believe this because it was likely that Union officials had 
uncovered a counterfeiting operation. (Thian 1879) 
 Another source of counterfeit Confederate bills that is often overlooked, and I believe 
under reported, are operations working outside of the United States, in locations such as Havana 
Cuba.  These bills likely made their way into the South in a number of ways.  In the case of 
counterfeits produced in Havana, the bills were reported to have been shipped through the Union 
blockade to either New Orleans or Mobile, as well as being shipped to Mexico where they would 
have been smuggled into the Confederacy by land.  There are examples of fifty, one-hundred, 
and five-hundred dollar bills that have been identified by the numismatic community as 
originating in Havana, Cuba.  Havana is not the only location outside the United States where 
counterfeit bills were likely produced. It has been documented that the Confederate Treasury 
Department believed that printing specialists that they had recruited from Europe to help 
jumpstart the South’s money printing capabilities were returning to their home countries with 
completed plates used to print Confederate bills and producing their own fakes from those.  
(Tremmel 2003) 
Another source was a counterfeiter from New York, simply identified as “Haney,” about 
whom not much seems to be known (Lee 1875).  He is only mentioned in a letter by Sam Upham 
to Dr. Lee for his book on Confederate counterfeiting.  In that letter, Upham mentions that he 
knew that his counterfeiting efforts were copied by a Haney and Hilton in New York.  The name 
Hilton clearly refers to Winthrop Hilton, who operated his counterfeiting business out of New 
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York; however this Haney has never been identified.  However, it is conceivable that if Haney 
was named as competition alongside Hilton, he likely ran a similar operation, particularly if it 
was sizable enough to be known by Upham. (Glaser 1967)   
Calculations 
It is possible to use estimations of the production of bills from unknown and known 
sources in order to calculate an approximation of the total value of the Confederate counterfeit 
money supply.  A previous paper published by Marc D. Weidenmier, called Bogus Money 
Matters: Sam Upham and His Confederate Counterfeiting Business,(1999) tried to calculate the 
significance of Union counterfeiting on the Confederate economy.  However, the results that 
were calculated by Weidenmier were incomplete at best, because they only take into account the 
fifteen million dollars printed by Sam Upham.  One important thing that that Weidenmier’s 
study did do was assume that not all of Upham’s counterfeits made their way into the southern 
economy.  Since these bills were produced in the North and were often sold as curiosities or 
souvenirs of the war, it can be assumed that not all of these bills made their way into the South’s 
economy.  Weidenmier calculated for counterfeiting as a percentage of the Confederate money 
supply based on 100, 66.6, 50, and 33.3 percent of Upham’s counterfeits reaching the money 
supply.  
 A second study was conducted by George Tremmel, who published it in the book 
Counterfeit Currency of the Confederate States of America (2003).  This study included many 
more sources for counterfeits including Winthrop Hilton, and under “other” category bills made 
in Havana, Cuba by an unknown producer; the Pyane Gang, which operated around northern 
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Kentucky; and finally, bills stolen from the Confederate government before they could be 
finished and properly released.  Since there are no exact figures for how many bills Hilton 
produced, but it is known that he was Sam Upham’s main competition and that he operated a 
similar sized operation, Tremmel estimates that Hilton produced around fifteen million dollars’ 
worth of bills also. Since there are no known figures or records for the “other” category, 
Tremmel assumed once again that this source could account for another fifteen million dollars in 
confederate money.  This is most likely a significant underestimation of the total value of bills 
produced by other sources.  While it is definitely true that Upham and Hilton were the two 
largest producers of counterfeit bills, there is no evidence that they produced two thirds of the 
total value of confederate bills entering the market.  It seems implausible, even without having a 
clear estimate on production numbers, to assume that the many other known and unknown 
counterfeiters would have only equaled numbers of a single operation.  Additionally, Tremmel 
does not seem to account for the fact that not all of Upham and Hilton’s bills would have made it 
into the South’s economy, and he should have accounted for that.  
 For my calculations, I will calculate an approximate maximum and minimum based on 
reasonable assumptions on how many bills entered the South.  For Sam Upham, it is known that 
by his own estimation after the war he produced approximately fifteen million dollars’ worth of 
bills.  It is safe to assume that some bills were legitimately purchased as curiosities or for some 
other reason did not enter the Confederacy.  A reasonable estimation for the number of bills to 
enter the Confederate economy would be sixty to eighty percent.  This conclusion was drawn 
because it is likely that anyone who purchased the bills to pass of as genuine would have 
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purchased them in bulk while souvenir collectors or anyone else who purchased a bill would 
have made much smaller purchases.  It is reasonable to conclude then that a large amount, as 
much as eighty percent could have made it to the south, while the lower range of sixty percent 
provides a more conservative estimate that hopefully captures the true value between them.  This 
accounts for between twelve and nine million dollars’ worth of counterfeit bills entering the 
economy.  Similarly, it can be assume that Hilton produced fifteen million dollars, having a 
similar time line and size of operation, but this study will subtract the million dollars’ worth of 
bills that the Secret Service seized when they arrested him for counterfeiting in 1863, since these 
bills would have not entered circulation.  That leaves an estimated fourteen million dollars’ 
worth of bills to enter the Confederate economy.  If a similar proportion of Hilton’s bills entered 
the Confederacy as Upham’s, between eleven point two and eight point four million dollars’ 
worth of Hilton’s bills entered the southern economy. 
All remaining sources of counterfeit bills fall under the “other” category. As mentioned 
before, Haney is another counterfeiter, who operated in New York. This is a counterfeiter not 
included by others in the consideration of total production, yet should be included  in the 
category “other,” even though not much is known about him. Yet, it is conceivable that Haney 
produced an operation comparable to Hilton, particularly since it appears to have been sizable 
enough to be known by Upham and mentioned years later in the letter to an author researching 
the subject. (Glaser 1967)  However, lacking more concrete information concerning Haney’s 
operations he will continue to be grouped under “other”.  With this new source and adding 
additional leeway for the countless counterfeiters that may never be discovered or have enough 
information existing to allow for a more accurate accounting of their contribution, twenty-five 
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million dollars is a better estimate for the total value of bills produced by other counterfeits. 
Since many of these sources originated in the South, and there is no clear figure to begin with, I 
do not see a need to take that figure as a percentage.  In total, between approximately forty- eight 
point two and forty- two point four million dollars’ worth of counterfeit money entered the 
Confederate economy.   
The Treasury Department of the Confederate States of America had entered $748.5 
million dollars into circulation by August 1863.  Even though the Confederate’s printed $860 
million dollars by the end of the war many counterfeiters halted their operations in August 1863 
because inflation was becoming so severe that it was no longer worth their efforts.  Therefore, to 
get the best results for the effect on the economy we should use the Confederate Treasury’s 
production number as of 1863, which is $748.5 million dollars.   
 
 Counterfeit 
value  
Amount of 
genuine money 
in the economy  
Total value of 
money in the 
economy 
Percent of total 
money supply 
made up of 
counterfeit bills 
High estimate  $48.2 million $748.5 million $796.7 million  6.04% 
Low estimate  $42.4 million $748.5 million $790.9 million 5.36% 
 
This means that between approximately 5.36% and 6.04% of all bills in circulation when 
the Confederate economy began to collapse were counterfeit bills.  This is a significant amount 
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and can explain one reason why inflation rates rose so high by the end of the war.  Additionally, 
this estimate is roughly 1.1 to 1.8 percent higher than the next highest estimate for percentage of 
counterfeit bill value compared to total money supply which was 4.2%from Tremmel. (Tremmel 
2003)  
It has proven hard to isolate the effects that counterfeiting had on the Confederate 
economy from other factors that could also partially explain the collapse of the Confederate 
economy.  One major variable that likely had a big impact on the Confederate economy around 
the same time is the Confederate losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, which made the war 
unwinnable in the eyes of many southerners and reduced their confidence in the future security 
of the Confederate money supply.  
Additionally, 5.36%- 6.04% inflation may only be the tip of the iceberg.  The actual 
inflation felt due to the counterfeit bills entering the economy was likely much higher.  
According to the equation %ΔM-(-%ΔY)=%ΔP since the Confederate economy would have 
been shrinking it would have had an amplifying effect resulting in a greater felt inflation due to 
the counterfeiting.  
Counterfeiting had a negative effect on consumer confidence in the Confederate 
economy.  The circumstances of Confederate currency issues, with multiple runs of the same 
genuine bill varying from one another slightly and over two hundred and fifty clerks signing the 
bills meant that it was extremely problematic for the government to even identify counterfeit 
bills.  Nonetheless, the Confederate government issued flyers to banks and major businesses in 
order to help them identify counterfeit bills, however, with the difficulty of identifying the well-
made counterfeits these flyers may have had the opposite effect desired.  Instead of increasing 
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the consumers’ confidence about whether a bill was genuine or not it caused entire series of 
genuine bills to be refused by businesses.  These series were then recalled by the Confederate 
government in order to be replaced by a design that they hoped would be harder to counterfeit. 
(Glaser 1967)  Ultimately, by fall 1863, the Confederate economy collapsed as its currency was 
so inflated that it was worthless.  While this cannot be attributed solely to counterfeiting, the 
Confederate losses at the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg certainly played a large part; 
however, counterfeiting definitely played a role in bringing the Confederate economy to its 
knees. 
Legal Issues 
The final issue was the legality of the counterfeiting of Confederate currency that was 
occurring on United States’ soil.  It was a complicated situation because normally a country will 
prosecute all cases of counterfeiting that occur on its soil, regardless of the country whose 
currency is being counterfeited.  This idea is found in Article 1 section 8 of the United States 
Constitution, which is known as the Counterfeiting Clause.  Although originally worded to only 
protect current United States currency from counterfeiting, it was later used as the basis for the 
United States government’s authority to prosecute all counterfeiting occurring within its borders.  
The new interpretation to this clause was notably upheld in the case of United States v. Arjona 
(1887), only roughly twenty years after the end of the Civil War.  In this court case, Ramon 
Arjona was charged with counterfeiting in the United States with the intent to defraud the 
securities of a foreign government, in this case Colombia by counterfeiting bills.  However, in 
the case of the counterfeiters of Confederate currency during the Civil War there is only 
evidence of one individual being arrested for activities related to counterfeiting, and that was 
only because it was believed that he was actually producing genuine currency for the 
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Confederate government. (Tremmel 2003)    In another case, that of the famous Sam Upham, he 
was investigated by federal agents and eventually his case was turned over to the Secretary of 
War only to be dismissed. (Mihm 2007)  I believe that the Union became the safe haven for 
counterfeiters during the Civil War not because the United States government necessarily 
supported their efforts or encouraged them.  Rather I believe that counterfeiting Confederate 
currency thrived in the North, because the United States government could not take action to 
prevent it without recognizing the Confederacy as an actual government.   
The United States government’s policy regarding the Confederacy was that it did not 
exist as an independent country, but rather was a collection of states in open rebellion against the 
United States.  The U. S. government never recognized the South’s right to secede from the 
Union and form a new country.  Additionally, neither the United States government nor the 
government of any major country ever officially recognized the Confederate States of America 
as a country.  This relates to the Confederacy’s currency because if they were never an official 
country then they lacked the authority to print and issue their own money.  It was effectively 
impossible to prosecute someone for counterfeiting Confederate currency because by the United 
States own policy the Confederacy was not a country and therefore did not have the authority to 
issue a currency.  This excluded the currency from the protection offered by the Counterfeit 
Clause.  Conversely, this argument would also mean that if the United States government had 
prosecuted a case of Confederate counterfeiting it would have to recognize the Confederacy as a 
country, in order to do so.  This was something the United States would never do, and in effect 
protected counterfeiters from being charged. 
Conclusion 
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In conclusion, the previous estimates made by historians regarding the amount of 
counterfeit Confederate bills in the money supply have been too low.  This can be accounted for 
largely from the under estimation of other sources of counterfeit bills for which there are no 
production figures, but for which estimates are possible.  The effects of counterfeiting cannot be 
accounted for with total accuracy in regards to economic factors such as inflation rates due to 
confounding variables such as recent Union victories, however, consumer confidence was clearly 
affected by the presence of counterfeits.  Additionally, the relative increase in price level due to 
counterfeiting was by my estimate between 6.44% and 5.66% which  would have likely been a 
significant amount had the South not been losing the war and suffering from hyperinflation. But 
in combination with the other sources of inflation previously mentioned such as lack of faith in 
the war’s outcome, it would be a serious problem.  And finally, the United States could not 
prosecute counterfeiters of Confederate currency because doing so would recognize the 
Confederacy as a legitimist government, and so counterfeiting could continue as long as 
counterfeiters could turn a profit.   
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